Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Mahala E. Lawlor v. R. Keith Lawlor : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
L. E. Nelson; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lawlor v. Lawlor, No. 7742 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1608

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

.MAHALA E.

L~-\ \YLOR

Plaintiff and Respondent
vs
R. KEITH LAWLOR,
Defendant and Appellant

I
\

RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF
Case No. 77 42

Appeal from the District Court of Cache County. Utah

Honorable Lewis Jones, District Judge

FILED
DEC 2 ·J 1951

L. E. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent

------------------------------·-------···
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF CASES AND STATUTES
Gardner v. Gardner, 222 P. 2d. 1055 ________ _
19 C. J. 88, Sec. 204, 205

----------·· 8, 9
-------- 13

POINTS
State of Facts ·------- _______________________________ _

1

Argument --------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------

4

· Point. I The findings, conclusions and decree awarding
plaintiff a divorce from defendant, are supported
by competent as well as by a preponderance
of the evidence ___ .__________________________ . ___________ .__________________ .______

4

Point II. The findings, conclusions and decree awarding the home and furniture to plaintiff, is supported by competent as well as by a preponderance of the evidence --------------------------------------·-----------·-----

9

Point

m.

Condonation -----------------------------------------------------·-·-··----- 12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MAHALA E. LAWLOR
Plaintiff and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S
"BRIEF

vs
R. KEITH LAWLOR,
Defendant and Appellant

Case No. 7742

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant. were married at Brigham
City, Utah, on the 8th day of May, 1931 (R. 32.) They
have one child, Ian Keith Lawlor, 20 years of age, and
because he is in the military service of the United States,
the Court made a finding that he had reached his majority (R. 12). Prior to 1942, the parties resided at
North Logan, and in September of that year they moved
into a small home at 38 North 1st East, Logan. It is
an old home and is partially modern (R. 33, 38). They
purchased it about October 21, 1944, at a cost of
$1600.00, paid from joint funds (R. 33, 58, 61). Plaintiff purchased necessary furniture and a refrigerator,
bathtub and bedroom suite (R. 37)· She has also paperSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ed and painted the interior of the house several times
(R. 37, 38, 62).

Defendant is partially disabled resulting from injury received in military service for the Canadian Government in World War I, and has been drawing monthly compensation of $25.00 (R. 40). Since the year 1942,
the defendant has not had regular employment (R. 38),
and from 1942, to date of trial (June 21, 1951) his aggregate income from employment was $1945.00 (R. 175).
Thus inorder to provide support for the family, in July
1942 plaintiff began to work at U. S. Depot Second
Street, Ogden, and was regularly employed there for
about 2¥2 years ( R. 33). After deducting transporta- ,
tion expense, her net monthly salary was about $135.00
(R· 34), and during the period that she was employed
there, her net aggregate salary income was $3780·00
(R. 173). Plaintiff was then transferred to Wicks at
Logan, where she was employed for a period of S
months, or until August, 1945, at a net monthly salary
of $180.00 (R. 34, 35), or an aggregate of $1440.001 (R.
173). Since September, 1945, she has had continuous
employment at J. C. Penny Company at Logan (R. 36,
37). Her net monthly salary from Pennys has been
about $120.00 and during the last two years she has
during evenings crocheted booties which were sold at
the store, from which she received an additional income
of $20.00 to $25.00 a month, (R· 36, 37) or an aggregate
salary income at Pennys of $9000.00 (R. 173). The
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money thus earned by plaintiff fro In July, 1942 to June

1951, aggregated about $14,220.00 (R. 173). Plaintiff
testified that the foregoing income was expended for
g-rocery bills. household expenses, the purchase of furniture. and support of the family ( R. 37, 195.)
On several occasions while these parties resided in
North Logan, defendant without provocation struck
plaintiff in the face with his fist and she was disabled
for several days (R. 41-47, 68). On one occasion plaintiff was in bed three days (R. 68). And since 1942
when they removed to Logan, defendant has without
provocation, violently struck plaintiff in public and at
home, from which she suffered intense pain and was
disabled for various periods of time (R. 41-46·) The
defendant exhibited a violent temper, and was officious
with plaintiff. Frequently when they were discussing
something, he would precipitate quarrels because of his
contentious attitude (R. 46-47).
It also appears from the record that the defendant
when attending socials, such as dances or private parties, and after partaking of intoxicating liquor he became quarrelsome and contentious and particularly with
the plaintiff and it was at such times he berated her or
struck her (R. 68). It also appeared that occasionally
when plaintiff and defendant attended dances or socials
that defendant assumed a hateful attitude towards the
plaintiff and after they returned home he precipitated
quarrels with, and ph~T:;;ically abused the plaintiff (R.
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At times when defendant abused plaintiff, she

69.)

warned him that if he didn't desist she would seek a divorce (R. 74.)

That on account of the defendant's

officious, quarrelsome and contentious attitude which he
frequently manifested toward the plaintiff, which became more intense during recent years, she became more
nervous and upset (R. 47, 78), and was obliged to seek
medical treatment from Doctor Hale, a Logan naturopathic physician, Doctor Viko, a Salt Lake specialist in
nervous diseases, and also Doctor C. J. Daines, family
physician (R. 47, 48, 177, 178).
ARGUMENT

Point I The findings, conclusions and decree award1-ng plaintiff a divorce from defendant, are supported
by competent as well as by a preponderance of the evidence.

There is direct and positive testimony by plaintiff
that on several occasions, over a period of some ten
years, defendant ha~ without provocation, forcibly
struck the plaintiff with his fist about her face and
head with serious effects ( R. -+ 1, 42, 43). On several
occasions she was confined to her bed in order to recover
from the injuries and shock (Tr. 42). The defendant
admitted slapping the plaintiff (R. 126). During the
month of December, 1949, these parties with ~fr. and
Mrs. Anderson and l\f r. and 1\f rs. Johnson attended a
dance, and after the dance the)r returned home and plain-
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tiff prepared a lunch and while they were eating defendant being intoxicated stood up, hit his fist on the
table and said: ''Even Jesus Christ is a phoney.'' They
were all surprised and mortified (R. 42, 43). After the
guests left the home, the defendant grabbed plaintiff
by the throat, threw her backwards in the bathroom
over the sink and seriously injured her back. He then
called her the "filthiest names·" (R. 43) Their son
was awakened and he called a taxicab, and meanwhile,
defendant was sharpening a butcher knife and threatened to ''finish'' plaintiff and their son. About that
time they left home, going first to police headquarters
to report the trouble created by defendant; then they
went to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, and remained there for three days until plaintiff recovered and
defendant's temper abated (R. 43). Defendant admitted
that plaintiff and son spent three days at J ohnsons'
home. (R. 157)
On another occasion in May, 1950, at a public dance
defendant was intoxicated and in describing the incident plaintiff testified: ''And at that time he got very
abusive. He put his hand in my face and pushed me
back in the chair and stood over me there and called
me very abusive names and swore as usual and caused
the whole party to break up that night." (R. 44), Plaintiff testified that thereafter she refused to go out in
public with him; that she had all the abuse she could
take in public (R. 44) There were other occasions when
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he abused her, but the foregoing were the most important occasions, as she testified: ''Those were really
the times they really did hurt and hurt very deeply.''
(R. 44)

Plaintiff testified that in addition to the foregoing
acts of cruelty, defendant has at least three times a year
since 1942, indicated that he was going to slap plaintiff
and she has avoided same (R. 46)· And, in order to
avoid being struck by him, she has ceased to ''discuss
things with him." (R. 46) "He's quick tempered and
he's very quick on the hands." "I didn't discuss anything with him because Keith knows it all." (R. 46)
Plaintiff testified that she could no longer endure
such physical and mental abuse. That her, "nerves are
completely gone." (R. 85). And as to the serious effect
of such treatment by defendant she testified: "It has
made me so nervous that there has been day after day
that I haven't been able to take care of my work at the
store because of my nervous condition. I've had to
ask the other girls to assist me, and I have had to stay
off the floor a lot of times and calm down so I could
go out on the floor and sell. I'd take spells and have
to have shots quite often, and I have taken medicine and
pills at constant intervals for my nerves. Also treatments from Dr. Hale.'' (R· 47)

~~

Plaintiff's condition gra~ually became worse,-"It
started right after we were married, because I was so
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nervous and so afraid of

I~eith."

(R. 47)

It affected

her nerves and heart (R. --l-8). Two years ago plaintiff
consulted Dr. Yiko in Salt Lake City, and with respect
to his diagnosis she testified: ''He (Dr. Viko) said it
was nothing, only the nervous strain that I was living
under." (R. ±8)
Dr. C. J. Daines, family physician, testified that
plaintiff has been extremely nervous, and that from appearances her condition could result from marital troubles (R. 177, 178). Plaintiff testified that her condition has improved since she moved away from the defendant (R. 48). The plaintiff is also corroborated by
the witness :J[rs. Coleman who works with the plaintiff
at Pennys store, who testified that since the complaint
was filed she had observed an improvement in the plaintiff's condition. (R. 92-94). It will thus appear that
plaintiff has patiently endured defendant's cruel treatment. It would be difficult to find a case where a party
withstood such abusive treatment for so many years.
Plaintiff's life and welfare was and is at stake.
The defendant admitted to some of the incidents
testified to h~· plaintiff. He also admitted coming home
intoxicated (R. 153). The witness Nyman testified that
defendant became intoxicated on a number of occasions
(R. 172)· Although defendant did not concede to all of
the acts of cruelty testified to by plaintiff and, conceding that there was some conflict in the evidence, yet the
court heard the evidence and observed the demeanor of
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the parties and their witnesses, and on disputed questions of fact he decided in favor of plaintiff.
Defendant contended that plaintiff was cruel to him
because of defendant's exhibits 1 to6 inclusive (R. 186188). This was a ridiculous contention. Plaintiff explained exhibits 1, 2 and 3 as common place which defendant enjoyed at the time (about 7 years before the
trial). They were brought home while plaintiff was
working at U. S. Depot at Ogden (R. 186-188). Plaintiff didn't know where exhibit 4 came from. Exhibit 5
was given to the defendant as a gift from the ladies
at the store (R. 187, 201). Exhibit 6 was brought home
by the defendant when he attended the D. A. V· convention in San Francisco (R. 186). When defendant saw
fit to bring such trash into court it demonstrated how
desperate he was to produce some kind of a defense.
He was certainly scraping the bottom of the harrell. It
also characterizes the defendant and gives a fair idea
of what sort of an individual plaintiff lived with for
twenty years.
In the case of Edith Gardner Y. Earl Gardner, 222
P. 2nd. 1055, the evidence revealed that the parties lived
together about six months, and that during that period
of time the defendant provoked a number of serious
quarrels which finally culminated in l\i[rs. Gardner's
suit for divorce in which she was awarded judgment,
and on appeal the decision was affirmed. Mr. Justice
McDonough wrote the opinion with unanimous concur-
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renee, and in the course of the opnion he stated:
"With respect to the contention that plaintiff's conduct was such that she was equally as
blameworthy as defendant, and that the court
should have denied her a decree, we are not disposed to disturb the findings of the trial court.
The judge observed the demeanor of the parties
and of their witnesses, and on disputed questions
of fact he decided in favor of plaintiff. No doubt
each of the parties expected that the other would
make greater adjustments to assure marital harmony· Such an attitude, however, did not justify
the defendant in doing things which destroyed
his wife's affections for him, nor in initiating
quarrels to keep her under a nervous tension.
There is evidence sufficient to warrant a finding
of mental cruelty.''
It is respectfully submitted that upon the authority
of that decision, the trial court was warranted in finding and concluding that defendant was guilty of mental
and physical cruelty in the instant case.
Point II. The findings, conclusions and decree awarding the home and furniture to plaintiff, is supported by competent as 1rell as by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The defendant testified that the dwelling and lot
was worth $4800.00 (R. 121, 161). Plaintiff valued the
home property at $2500.00. (R. 83). The witness Johnson, an expert witness, valued this property at $3000.00.
And that it had a loan value of about $1200 (R. 31) ·
It is rather difficult to understand defendant's theory
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
with respect to the value of the home property.

He

does not allege any particular value in his answer. But
he prays therein for ''all the real property, Canadian
bonds and Plymouth car together with a reasonable
share of said furniture."

In other words he asked the

court to give him all the property, except a portion of
the furniture. This is a rather reckless demand in view
of the fact that it was plaintiff's income that supported
the family from about July, 1942 until May 26, 1951,
when the action was begun. Then he follows the foregoing demand with a reckless and unfounded valuation
on the real property of $4800.00 (R. 121, 161). This is
about $1800.00 above the valuation placed thereon by
a real estate man of thirty years experience (R. 30).
It may be that defendant thought he could frustrate plaintiff's claim for the home by inflating its
value far above the value of the bonds ($1340) and the
car ($500). But after the court heard the valuation
placed thereon by a disinterested witness, and the discription of the house and its size and ancient vintage:
and considering and comparing the plaintiff's income
of $14,200.00, with defendant's income of about $2000·00,
during the same period of time, the court concluded
that a fair division of the property would result b~·
awarding the home and furniture to plaintiff, and the
bonds and car, and some articles of personal property to
defendant. But since the defendant had testified that
the real estate was well worth $4800.00 (R. 121, 161), the
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court afforded him an opportunity to acquire it by paying that price, and addinp; thE-reto $100.00 for the linoleum. and $100.00 for the curtains (R. 207). When defendant's counsel said the home could not be sold for
$4800.00, (R. 208) the court replied,-"You say the
property is worth $4800.00, '' xxxxx ''and the court is
giving him the right of getting the property at his own
valuation." ( R. 208).
Plaintiff had industriously made improvements on
the home, and purchased new furniture from her income,
and it is situated near the store where she is employed,
and she will take care of it- On the other hand, if the
court had awarded the home to the defendant, in addition to the bonds and the car, it would have been a
grossly inequitable division of the property. And it
is likely that he would neglect it. Plaintiff testified
that during the time that he had possession of the
home, between the commencement of the action and the
trial thereof, she had occasion to go back to the home
and she found it in a very disheveled and run-down
condition. She testified that it looked terrible. (R. 191)
The defendant contended that the car was worth
only $200.00. However, the evidence showed without
dispute that the car had a new motor and new tires,
and the defendant informed the plaintiff that he wouldn't take less t~an $500.00 for the car. (R. 49)
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in this
case supports the courts findings, conclusions and deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cree, awarding to plaintiff the home, and furniture; and
to the defendant the Canadian bonds, the car, and some
articles of personal property.
Point III.

Condonation

There was no allegation made in plaintiff's answer that the cruelty of the defendant, if any, was condoned by the plaintiff, and no reference was made to
the subject of condonation during the trial.

The find-

ings, conclusions and decree were signed by the Court
on July 16, 1951, and there was no reference made
therein to the subject of condonation.

On July 23,

1951, and after the case was closed, the defendant made
a motion to amend his answer to provide that although
defendant denies acts of cruelty, but,-'' if true, plaintiff
has condoned the same.'' After some consideration of
defendant's proposed amendment the court made a supplemental finding to the effect that the parties had
been quarreling and having differences with each other
for a number of years, and after each severe quarrel
there was a reconciliation and a conditional condonation
on the part of the plaintiff But in each and every
instance the defendant had failed to meet the conditions
under which condonation was entered into between plaintiff, and the court therefore finds on this issue that
there never was a complete eondonation between the
parties. (R. 215) With the court's permission, plaintiff's reply was amended by adding the following para·
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graph 21 ~- •Denies paragraph three of said answer as
.. ..
amended. ( R. 7)

,

It is respectfully sub1nitted that the court's supplemental finding is correct. Respondent respectfully submits that the following rule is controlling here:

'' ..\ repetition of the offense after condonation reYiYe~ the original offense. Thus if a
reconciliation tab.'s place after a separation because of cruelty, subsequent cruel conduct of the
guilty party revives the former acts and permits
a divorce upon the ground of all acts of cruelty,
either before or after the reconciliation. An
offense which has been condoned may be revived
not only by a repitition of the same offense, but
also by the subsequent commission of other marital offenses." 19 C. J. 88, Sections 204, 205.
For the foregoing reasons respondent respectfully
submits that the judgment and decree of the trial court
should be affirmed, with costs.
Respectfully submitted
L. E. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent-
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